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THE UPC SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT/BEST INTEREST 
STANDARD FOR GUARDIAN DECISIONS: 
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM† 
Lawrence A. Frolik* 
Linda S. Whitton** 
The introduction in 1997 of “substituted judgment” as a guiding principle for 
guardian decisions was a key contribution of the UPC to guardianship reform. 
The current UPC Section 5-314(a) instructs guardians to “consider the expressed 
desires and personal values of the ward” when making decisions and to “at all 
times . . . act in the ward’s best interest.” This dual mandate for guardian deci-
sions was intended to promote the self-determination interests of incapacitated 
adults. This Article argues that in practice the standard has failed to achieve this 
goal. It analyzes the shortcomings of UPC Section 5-314(a) and other statutory 
decision-making standards and offers an improved decision-making model. Frolik 
and Whitton propose reform of Section 5-314(a) to provide better guidance for 
guardians, and to harmonize the standard for guardian decisions with other sur-
rogate decision-making standards within the UPC. 
Introduction 
The 1997 Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings 
Act (UGPPA)1 introduced to the Uniform Probate Code (UPC)2 
the concept of substituted judgment as a guiding principle for 
guardian decisions. The 1997 UGPPA mandates that “[a] guardian, 
in making decisions, shall consider the expressed desires and  
                                                   
† © 2011 Lawrence A. Frolik and Linda S. Whitton. All rights reserved. 
* Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law. 
** Professor of Law and Michael and Dianne Swygert Research Fellow, Valparaiso 
University School of Law. 
1. Unif. Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act § 314 cmt. (1997), 8A 
U.L.A. 370 (2003) (“Although the guardian only need consider the ward’s desires and values 
to the extent known to the guardian, that phrase should not be read as an ‘out’ for the 
guardian. Instead, the guardian must make an effort to learn the ward’s personal values and 
ask the ward about the ward’s desires before the guardian makes a decision. When the 
guardian is making decisions for the ward, the guardian, wherever possible, should use the 
substitute decision-making standard . . . . in reaching a decision, making the decision the 
ward would make, if competent to do so.”). Other significant contributions of the 1997 
UGPPA include the concepts of limited guardian and limited conservator, and the im-
portance of functional assessment in determining incapacity. See § 102 cmt., 8A U.L.A. at 
313–14. 
2. The UGPPA comprises Article 5, Parts 3 & 4 of the Uniform Probate Code. 
Frolik & Whitton FTP 4_C.doc  8/3/2012 10:39 AM 
740 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 45:4 
personal values of the ward to the extent known to the guardian.”3 
This emphasis on the unique wishes and views of the ward signifi-
cantly differs from the 1982 UGPPA and the original 1969 UPC, 
both of which treated guardianship of incapacitated adults the 
same as that of minors.4 Prior to the 1997 UGPPA, judges viewed 
adult guardianship primarily as a protective arrangement,5 with a 
guardian expected to do what was “best” for an incapacitated adult, 
much as if the guardian were a parent.6  
The new “substituted judgment” language in the UPC signaled a 
paradigm shift. By requiring guardians to consider what the inca-
pacitated person would want, the UPC focus for adult guardianship 
became broader than mere protection—it came to include recog-
nition of an adult’s self-determination interests.7 This shift 
reflected a growing emphasis in the 1980s on the rights of incapac-
itated adults.8 
The 1997 UGPPA did not, however, reject the beneficent parens 
patriae model for adult guardianship. Section 314(a) of the Act also 
requires that “[a] guardian at all times shall act in the ward’s best 
interest.”9 Section 314(a) in its entirety provides: 
Except as otherwise limited by the court, a guardian shall 
make decisions regarding the ward’s support, care, education, 
health, and welfare. A guardian shall exercise authority only 
as necessitated by the ward’s limitations and, to the extent 
possible, shall encourage the ward to participate in decisions, 
act on the ward’s own behalf, and develop or regain the ca-
                                                   
3. Unif. Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act § 314(a) (1997), 8A U.L.A. 
369 (2003). 
4. See § 314 cmt., 8A U.L.A. 370 (“Under Section 2-209 of the 1982 Act (U.P.C. Sec-
tion 5-309 (1982)), the guardian of an incapacitated person was simply granted the powers 
of guardian of a minor, provisions of which were located in the counterpart provisions in 
Article 2 (Part 2 of Article 5).”); Unif. Probate Code § 5-312(a) (1969) (amended 2011) 
(giving the guardian of an incapacitated adult “the same powers, rights and duties respect-
ing his ward that a parent has respecting his unemancipated minor child”). 
5. See Lawrence A. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, A Critique and a Proposal 
for Reform, 23 Ariz. L. Rev. 599, 601–03 (1981). 
6. See Michael Casasanto et al., A Model Code of Ethics for Guardians, 11 Whittier L. 
Rev. 543, 547 (1989) (observing that the best interest standard embodies “the view that the 
guardian’s duties are akin to those imposed on a parent”). 
7. See supra note 1. For a discussion of how the doctrine of substituted judgment 
promotes individual autonomy and self-determination, see Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Do-
minion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom 224 
(1993). 
8. See generally ABA Comm’n on the Mentally Disabled & ABA Comm’n on Legal 
Problems of the Elderly, Guardianship: An Agenda for Reform (1989). 
9. Unif. Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act § 314(a) (1997), 8A U.L.A. 
369 (2003) (emphasis added). 
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pacity to manage the ward’s personal affairs. A guardian, in 
making decisions, shall consider the expressed desires and personal 
values of the ward to the extent known to the guardian. A guardian 
at all times shall act in the ward’s best interest and exercise reasonable 
care, diligence, and prudence.10 
Thus, a guardian operating under the decision-making standard of 
the 1997 Act has a dual mandate—to consider the incapacitated 
adult’s expressed desires and personal values and to act at all times 
in that person’s best interest.11  
While this UPC “dual mandate” for guardian decisions was, in 
theory, a step forward in protecting the self-determination interests 
of incapacitated adults, we will make the argument that, in prac-
tice, the standard has fallen short of intended law reform goals. As 
a foundation for this argument, we first assess how many jurisdic-
tions have adopted statutory language that can be construed as 
requiring guardians to use some form of substituted judgment. 
This assessment will show that only slightly more than one-third of 
American jurisdictions have statutory decision-making standards 
that include substituted judgment, and that nearly all such statutes 
fail to provide guidance about how to use substituted judgment 
and best interest when making surrogate decisions. We then offer a 
surrogate decision-making model that illustrates how substituted 
judgment and best interest can be used across a continuum to 
maximize the self-determination interests of incapacitated adults. 
This model synthesizes the various theories about the meaning of 
substituted judgment and best interest and addresses the practical 
challenges of implementing those concepts in surrogate decisions. 
Finally, we propose a revision to Section 314(a) of the 1997 
UGPPA. The purpose of this proposal is two-fold: first, to provide 
better guidance to guardians, and second, to harmonize the surro-
gate decision-making standard of the UGPPA with those of the 
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act12 and the Uniform Power of 
Attorney Act.13  
                                                   
10. Id. (emphasis added). 
11. Id. 
12. See Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act (1994), 9 U.L.A. pt. IB, at 88 (2005) (con-
taining three surrogate decision-making standards: section 2(e) (health-care agents), section 
5(f) (surrogates for persons without a health-care agent or guardian), and section 6(a) 
(guardians)). 
13. See Unif. Power of Attorney Act § 114(a) (2006), 8B U.L.A. 78 (Supp. 2011) 
(providing the surrogate decision-making standard for agents). 
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I. Statutory Guardianship Decision-Making Standards 
In preparation for the recent third National Guardianship 
Summit,14 we reviewed all adult guardianship statutes to determine 
how many contain general decision-making standards and whether 
those standards emphasize substituted judgment, best interest, or 
both.15 We excluded from our examination statutory provisions 
specific to health-care decision-making and focused instead on de-
cision-making standards for all other types of guardian decisions. 
We found that twenty-eight jurisdictions, a majority of the fifty-two 
reviewed, have no articulated decision-making standard for the 
guardians of incapacitated adults.16 Six states have guardianship 
                                                   
14. The Third National Guardianship Summit, “Standards of Excellence,” was held at 
the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law in Salt Lake City, Utah on October 12–
15, 2011. See Guardianship Summit 2011, http://www.guardianshipsummit.org (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2012) (Summit website). The first such Summit was the National Guardianship 
Symposium, held in 1988 in Racine, Wisconsin (known as the “Wingspread Symposium” 
after the Johnson Foundation Wingspread Conference Center where the conference was 
held). In 2001, the Second National Guardianship Conference, “Wingspan,” was held at 
Stetson University College of Law, Tampa Bay, Florida. See Summit History, Guardianship 
Summit 2011, http://www.guardianshipsummit.org/summit-history (last visited Feb. 24, 
2012). 
15. See Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision-Making Standards for 
Guardians: Theory and Reality, Utah L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012). 
16. See Ala. Code §§ 26-2-2 to -55, 26-2A-1 to -160, 26-3-1 to -14, 26-5-1 to -54, 26-8-1 
to -52, 26-9-1 to -5 and -7 to -19 (LexisNexis 2009); Alaska Stat. §§ 13.26.001–.410 (2010); 
Ark. Code Ann. §§ 28-65-101 to -603; 28-66-101 to -124; 28-67-101 to -111 (2004); Cal. Prob. 
Code §§ 1400–1490, 1500–1611, 1800–1970, 2100–2893 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 12, §§ 3901–3997 (2007 & Supp. 2010); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 744.101–.715, 
747.01–.052 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 15-5-101 to -603 (2009 & Supp. 
2011); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 29-3-1-1 to -13-3 (West 2010); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 633.551–.682 
(West 2003 & Supp. 2011); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 387.010–.990 (LexisNexis 2010); La. 
Code Civ. Proceedings Ann. art. 4542–4569 (1998 & Supp. 2011) and La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 9:1021 to :1034 (2008); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-101 to -105, 5-301 to -432 (1998 
& Supp. 2011); Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts §§ 13-101 to -222, 13-704 to -908 (LexisNexis 
2011); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 524.5-101 to -502 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); Miss. Code Ann. 
§§ 93-13-1 to -281 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 72-5-101 to -638 (2011); 
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-2601 to -2672 (2008); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 464-A:1 to :47 (Lex-
isNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-5-101 to -617 (2004); N.D. Cent. Code 
§§ 30.1-26-01 to -29-31 (2010); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, §§ 1-101 to 4-904 (West 2009 & 
Supp. 2012); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 125.005–.650 (2011); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 62-5-101 to -435 
(2010 & Supp. 2010); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 34-1-101 to 34-3-109 (2007 & Supp. 2011); Tex. 
Prob. Code Ann. §§ 601–916 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-5-101 
to -433 (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp. 2010); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, §§ 2602–3081 (2011) (how-
ever, § 2797 requires a guardian to “manage the estate of his ward . . . in a manner most 
beneficial to the ward,” which could be equated with a “best interest” standard); Wyo. Stat. 
§§ 3-1-101 to -3-1106 (2011). 
Of these twenty-eight jurisdictions, fourteen have provisions with language similar to the 
1969 UPC provision that grants the guardian of an incapacitated adult the “same powers, rights 
and duties” as a parent. Ala. Code § 26-2A-78(a) (LexisNexis 2009); Alaska Stat. 
§ 13.26.150(c) (2010); Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3922(b) (2007); Idaho Code Ann. § 15-5-312 
(2009); Ind. Code Ann. § 29-3-8-1(a), (b)(1) (West 2010); La. Code Civ. Proceedings Ann. 
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statutes that refer to “best interest” in the context of guardian deci-
sions, but do not include substituted judgment language.17 The 
remaining eighteen jurisdictions include some type of substituted 
judgment language,18 fourteen of which also refer to best interest.19 
Given the UGPPA’s dual mandate that guardians make decisions 
according to both substituted judgment and best interest, our 
analysis of current state statutes focuses on the fourteen jurisdic-
tions that have adopted both concepts in some manner. 
                                                   
art. 4566(A) (Supp. 2011) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, the relationship between 
interdict and curator is the same as that between minor and tutor.”); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 9:1032(A) (2008) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Part, the relationship between an 
interdict and his curator or continuing tutor is the same as that between a minor and his 
tutor, with respect to the person and property of the interdict.”); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-
A, § 5-312(a) (1998); Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts § 13-708(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2011); 
Mont. Code Ann. § 72-5-321(2) (2011); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2628(a) (2008); N.M. Stat. 
Ann. § 45-5-312(B) (2004); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-5-312(a) (2010); Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-
312(2) (1993); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-201(e) (2011). See also supra note 4 and accompanying 
text. 
A few of the jurisdictions with no general surrogate decision-making standard provide a 
specific standard for health care decisions. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 13.26.150(e)(3) (2010); 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3922(b)(3) (2007); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A, § 5-312(a)(3) 
(1998); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 524.5-313(c)(4)(i) (West Supp. 2012); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-
2628(a)(3) (2008); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 464-A:25(e) (Supp. 2011); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-
5-312(B)(3) (2004). 
17. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 475.120(2) (West 2009); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 159.083, 
159.079 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 35A-1241(a)(3), 35A-1251 
(2011); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2111.14 (West 2005); R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-15-29 (1995); 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 11.92.043(4) (West 2010). 
18. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-5312(A)(11) (2005); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-14-
314(1) (West 2011); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45a-656(b) (West Supp. 2011); D.C. Code 
§ 21-2047(a)(6) (West Supp. 2011); Ga. Code Ann. § 29-4-22(a) (West 2007); Haw. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 560:5-314(a) (LexisNexis 2006); 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11a-17(e) (West 
Supp. 2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-3075(a)(2) (Supp. 2010); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 
190B, § 5-309(a) (West Supp. 2010); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 700.5314 (West 2002); N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 3B: 12-57 (West 2007); N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§ 81.20–.21 (McKinney 2006 & 
Supp. 2011); 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5521(a) (West 2005); S.D. Codified Laws § 29A-5-
402 (West 2004); V.I. Code Ann. tit. 15, § 5-314(a) (Supp. 2011); Va. Code Ann. § 37.2-
1020(E) (2005); W. Va. Code Ann. § 44A-3-1(e) (LexisNexis 2010); Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 54.20(1)(b) (West 2008).  
19. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-14-314(1) (West 2011); D.C. Code § 21-2047(a)(6) 
(West Supp. 2010); Ga. Code Ann. § 29-4-22(a) (West 2007); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 560:5-
314(a) (2006); 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11a-17(e) (West Supp. 2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. 
§ 59-3075(a)(2) (Supp. 2010); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, § 5-309(a) (2010); N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 3B:12-57 (West 2007); 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5521(a) (West 2005); S.D. Codified 
Laws § 29A-5-402 (West 2004); V.I. Code Ann. tit. 15, § 5-314(a) (Supp. 2011); Va. Code 
Ann. § 37.2-1020(E) (2005); W. Va. Code Ann. § 44A-3-1(e) (LexisNexis 2010); Wis. Stat. 
Ann. § 54.20(1)(b) (West 2008).  
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A. Substituted Judgment/Best Interest Standards 
The fourteen guardianship statutes that contain both substituted 
judgment and best interest language can be categorized into three 
types: “dual mandate” jurisdictions, with language similar to the 
1997 UGPPA; “hierarchy” jurisdictions, with language that either 
directs or implies that guardians should first use substituted judg-
ment if possible and otherwise apply best interest; and “no 
priority” jurisdictions, with statutory language that provides no 
guidance as to how guardians are to use substituted judgment and 
best interest. The following further describes and analyzes these 
statutory approaches. 
1. Dual Mandate Jurisdictions  
Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands 
adopted the 1997 UGPPA language that requires a guardian to 
“consider the expressed desires and personal values of the ward” 
and “at all times . . . act in the ward’s best interest.”20 What an inca-
pacitated person wants and what is in the incapacitated person’s 
best interest are often the same, but the statute does not tell a 
guardian what to do when a decision reached under substituted 
judgment conflicts with one made according to best interest. The 
original comment to Section 314(a) did not address this tension,21 
while a revised comment in the Uniform Laws Annotated states 
that a guardian should use the traditional best interest decision-
making standard “[o]nly when a guardian is not able to ascertain 
information about the ward’s preferences and desires.”22 Given that 
the plain language of the statute does not reflect this sentiment, a 
guardian risks violating the statute when a decision based on sub-
stituted judgment might not meet a best interest test.  
2. Hierarchy Jurisdictions  
Massachusetts, South Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia have 
statutory language similar to the 1997 UGPPA, but with one im-
                                                   
20. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-14-314(1) (West 2011); Ga. Code Ann. § 29-4-22(a) 
(West 2007); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 560:5-314(a) (LexisNexis 2006); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-
3075(a)(2) (Supp. 2009); V.I. Code Ann. tit. 15, § 5-314(a) (Supp. 2010). 
21. See Unif. Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act § 314 cmt. (1997), 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ugppa97.htm. 
22. Unif. Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act § 314 cmt. (1997), 8A 
U.L.A. 370 (2003). 
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portant difference. Rather than require that a guardian act at all 
times in the incapacitated person’s best interest, these statutes re-
quire a guardian to “consider the expressed desires and personal 
values of the ward” and to “otherwise act in the ward’s best inter-
est.”23 It is interesting to note that early drafts of the 1997 UGPPA 
also provided that, “[a] guardian shall otherwise act in the ward’s 
best interest.”24 The phrase “at all times” did not replace “other-
wise” until the January 30, 1997 draft of the UGPPA.25 Although not 
explicit, the wording of the early drafts of the 1997 UGPPA and of 
these four state statutes suggests that a guardian is to first consider 
the expressed desires and personal values of the incapacitated per-
son, but if that is not possible, to “otherwise” make a decision 
based on best interest.  
Two jurisdictions, the District of Columbia and Illinois, state an 
explicit hierarchy favoring substituted judgment over best interest 
in their adult guardianship statutes. The D.C. statute provides that 
the guardian shall “[m]ake decisions on behalf of the ward by con-
forming as closely as possible to a standard of substituted judgment 
or, if the ward’s wishes are unknown and remain unknown after 
reasonable efforts to discern them, make the decision on the basis 
of the ward’s best interest.”26 Illinois provides the most detailed di-
rections for using substituted judgment and best interest in a 
hierarchical fashion: 
Decisions made by a guardian on behalf of a ward shall be 
made in accordance with the following standards for decision 
making. Decisions made by a guardian on behalf of a ward 
may be made by conforming as closely as possible to what the 
ward, if competent, would have done or intended under the 
                                                   
23. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, § 5-309(a) (2010); S.D. Codified Laws § 29A-5-402 
(West 2004); Va. Code Ann. § 37.2-1020 (E) (2005); W. Va. Code Ann. § 44A-3-1(e) (Lex-
isNexis 2010) (emphasis added). 
24. See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Draft Unif. Guardian-
ship & Protective Proceedings Act § 313(a) (July 12–19, 1996) (annual meeting draft) 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ugppa/ 
ugppa796.htm. See also Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Draft Unif. 
Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act § 313(a) (May 28, 1996 Draft), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ugppa/28May96.htm; Nat’l Conference of 
Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Draft Unif. Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act 
§ 313(a) (Apr. 17, 1996 Draft), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ 
ulc/ugppa/ugppa496.htm; Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Draft 
Unif. Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act § 308(a) (Oct. 24, 1995 Draft), availa-
ble at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ugppa/ugppaoct.htm. 
25. See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Draft Unif. Guardian-
ship & Protective Proceedings Act § 313(a) (Jan. 30, 1997 Draft), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ugppa/ugppa.htm. 
26. D.C. Code § 21-2047(a)(6) (Supp. 2011). 
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circumstances, taking into account evidence that includes, 
but is not limited to, the ward’s personal, philosophical, reli-
gious and moral beliefs, and ethical values relative to the 
decision to be made by the guardian. Where possible, the 
guardian shall determine how the ward would have made a 
decision based on the ward’s previously expressed prefer-
ences, and make decisions in accordance with the preferences 
of the ward. If the ward’s wishes are unknown and remain un-
known after reasonable efforts to discern them, the decision 
shall be made on the basis of the ward’s best interests as de-
termined by the guardian. In determining the ward’s best 
interests, the guardian shall weigh the reason for and nature 
of the proposed action, the benefit or necessity of the action, 
the possible risks and other consequences of the proposed ac-
tion, and any available alternatives and their risks, conse-
consequences and benefits, and shall take into account any 
other information, including the views of family and friends, 
that the guardian believes the ward would have considered if 
able to act for herself or himself.27 
3. No Priority Jurisdictions  
Three states—Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Wisconsin—use 
both substituted judgment and best interest language in their stat-
utes, but do not indicate what relative weight guardians are to give 
substituted judgment and best interest when making decisions.28 In 
the context of health care decisions, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania held that “where there is enough data for the decision 
maker to ascertain what the patient would have desired, the decision 
                                                   
27. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11a-17(e) (West Supp. 2011). 
28. See 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5521(a) (West 2005) (“It shall be the duty of the 
guardian of the person to assert the rights and best interests of the incapacitated person. 
Expressed wishes and preferences of the incapacitated person shall be respected to the 
greatest possible extent . . . .”); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:12-57 (West 2007) (“[A] guardian of the 
person of a ward shall exercise authority over matters relating to the rights and best interest 
of the ward’s personal needs . . . . [A] guardian shall give due regard to the preferences of 
the ward, if known to the guardian or otherwise ascertainable upon reasonable inquiry.”); 20 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5521(a) (West 2005) (“It shall be the duty of the guardian of the 
person to assert the rights and best interests of the incapacitated person. Expressed wishes 
and preferences of the incapacitated person shall be respected to the greatest possible ex-
tent.”); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 54.18(2)(b), .20(1)(b) (West 2008) (requiring a guardian to 
“[a]dvocate for the ward’s best interests” and consider, consistent with the functional limita-
tions of the incapacitated person, “[t]he ward’s personal preferences and desires with 
regard to managing his or her activities of daily living”). 
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maker must effectuate substituted judgment.”29 The Court added 
that in such circumstances “a best interests analysis may not be em-
ployed,”30 suggesting that substituted judgment and best interest are 
treated as polar opposites in Pennsylvania. By contrast, the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey has held that “[t]he substituted-judgment and 
best-interest tests are not dichotomous, but represent points on a 
continuum of subjective and objective information leading to a reli-
able decision that gives as much weight as possible to the right of 
self-determination.”31 These examples illustrate the potential diffi-
culty for guardians who must extrapolate guidance from vague 
statutory language. 
II. The Need for an Improved Substituted  
Judgment/Best Interest Standard 
In the following section, we critique the deficiencies of current 
statutory decision-making standards. These deficiencies include 
possible inconsistent outcomes under substituted judgment and 
best interest, the dilemma posed when substituted judgment leads 
to an unreasonable outcome, and the unaddressed distinction be-
tween what is reasonable and what is best. We then offer an 
improved decision-making model that places substituted judgment 
and best interest on a continuum to maximize the role of self-
determination in surrogate decisions for incapacitated adults.  
A. Deficiencies in Current Statutory Decision-Making Standards  
Regardless of what type of substituted judgment/best interest 
statute governs a guardian’s conduct, none provide adequate guid-
ance for common decision-making problems. For example, the 
UGPPA “dual mandate” type statute32 fails to resolve conflict in 
outcomes when applying both substituted judgment and best in-
terest. A decision that follows the incapacitated person’s previously 
expressed desires might not meet a best interest test. Although a 
guardian could claim reliance on the Section 314(a) comment that 
gives priority to substituted judgment over best interest,33 we have 
found no statutory or case law support, outside of the health-care 
                                                   
29. In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 912 n.11 (Pa. 1996). 
30. Id. 
31. In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1280 (N.J. 1994). 
32. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
33. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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decision-making context, for the proposition that a guardian who 
blindly follows substituted judgment to the detriment of an inca-
pacitated adult will be protected.34 In fact, one can argue that the 
UGPPA mandate to “at all times act in the ward’s best interest and 
exercise reasonable care, diligence, and prudence”35 constrains a guardian 
from following substituted judgment to an unreasonable result.  
The same difficulty arises under hierarchy statutes36 and statutes 
with no specified priority between substituted judgment and best 
interest.37 Even the very detailed Illinois statute does not address 
what a guardian should do if substituted judgment leads to an un-
reasonable result.38 Although the goal of substituted judgment is 
self-determination, the right of an adult with capacity to make a 
seemingly foolish or irresponsible decision must be distinguished 
from mandating that the guardian act in an unreasonable manner. 
As a policy and practical matter, guardians and other surrogates 
should not be expected to implement directives or preferences 
that would be unwise or injurious to the person or property of the 
incapacitated individual. Guardianship, after all, is designed to 
protect an incapacitated person who can no longer manage per-
sonal and property decisions.39 In addition, guardians should be 
protected from mandates that either cause emotional conflict or 
professional embarrassment because the guardian is forced to act 
unreasonably, or that might create liability because the guardian is 
forced to violate fiduciary obligations.40 Mandating substituted 
                                                   
34. We are not commenting on end-of-life decision making by guardians, who may be 
required by state law to carry out the expressed wishes of the incapacitated person without 
regard to whether the decision is in the person’s best interest. See, e.g., Unif. Health-Care 
Decisions Act § 6(a) (1994), 9 U.L.A. 116 (2005) (“A guardian shall comply with the 
ward’s individual instructions and may not revoke the ward’s advance health-care directive 
unless the appointing count expressly so authorizes.”). 
35. Unif. Guardianship & Protective Proceedings Act § 314(a) (1997), 8A U.L.A. 
369 (2003) (emphasis added). 
36. See supra notes 23, 26, and 27 and accompanying text. 
37. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
38. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
39. For example, the Pennsylvania guardianship statute states:  
[I]t is the purpose of this chapter to promote the general welfare of all citizens by es-
tablishing a system which permits incapacitated persons to participate as fully as 
possible in all decisions which affect them, which assists these persons in meeting the 
essential requirements for their physical health and safety, protecting their rights, 
managing their financial resources . . . .  
20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5502 (West 2005). 
40. For analogous protection of agents under powers of attorney, see Unif. Power of 
Attorney Act (2006), 8B U.L.A. 78 (Supp. 2011) (obligating an agent to “act in accord-
ance with the principal’s reasonable expectations to the extent actually known by the agent 
and, otherwise, in the principal’s best interest”) (emphasis added). 
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judgment, even when the results are unreasonable, would likely 
deter both family members and professional guardians from serv-
ing as surrogates. 
The problem of unreasonable directives under a substituted 
judgment standard can arise in two contexts. An incapacitated per-
son’s preference may have been unreasonable when initially made, 
or it may become unreasonable because of changed circumstances. 
The latter may justify rejection of a previously stated preference 
when it is likely that the incapacitated person would make a differ-
ent decision if able to comprehend the new circumstances. For 
example, suppose an incapacitated person had always invested 
ninety percent of her retirement assets in XYZ Inc., a computer 
manufacturer for whom she had worked for thirty-five years. She 
repeatedly told her investment advisor that XYZ stock, which paid a 
high annual dividend, was the “ideal” stock to own as a retiree. 
Now suffering from severe dementia, the incapacitated person is 
dependent for her support on XYZ stock dividends. Unfortunately, 
over the past two years the company reduced the dividend by sev-
enty percent. The guardian decides to sell half of the XYZ stock 
and buy ABC Co., which pays a much higher dividend. The guardi-
an correctly assumes that the incapacitated person, if competent, 
would agree to the sale because XYZ no longer pays the dividend 
that was the basis for her belief that it was an “ideal” retirement 
asset.  
The question for a guardian becomes: What is reasonable and 
what degree of changed circumstances justifies rejection of substi-
tuted judgment? Of course, the answer is, “it depends.” Guardians 
must determine on a decision-by-decision basis when it is reasona-
ble to apply substituted judgment, and when they should reject or 
modify it. If the guardian is uncertain as to the wisdom of following 
the incapacitated person’s prior instructions, or if the decision is 
particularly crucial or controversial, the guardian can petition the 
court for guidance.41 In most cases, however, the guardian will in-
dependently weigh the circumstances and make a decision. 
While common sense may prompt most guardians to temper 
substituted judgment with reasonableness, current statutory 
decision-making standards do not explicitly include a 
reasonableness requirement that would protect guardians and the 
                                                   
41. See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Nagy, Nos. H035747, H035796, 2011 WL 1330769, 
at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2011) (describing a court-appointed temporary conservator’s 
request for permission for the incapacitated person to remain in Great Britain rather than 
be returned to her California home, which the conservator determined to be in her best 
interest, despite an explicit statement in her advance health directive that she wanted to live 
in her California home for as long as possible). 
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incapacitated persons they serve. If a statute requires that a 
decision meet the best interest test, however, such a decision would 
also be reasonable. By definition, to serve an individual’s best 
interest is to act in a manner that promotes the welfare and well-
being of the individual.42  
Ironically, while dual mandate-type statutes like the UGPPA may 
deter unreasonable decisions, they also deprive incapacitated per-
sons of the right to substituted judgments that produce reasonable 
outcomes. Some outcomes may be reasonable or “good” but not 
optimum, and therefore might not satisfy a best interest test. Con-
sider a farmer who is the fourth generation to occupy a family 
heritage farm. The farmer has left specific instructions that the 
farm should be sold to his son when the farmer can no longer live 
there. Now that the farmer’s health has deteriorated, his guardian 
must decide whether to sell the farm to the son on an installment 
contract at fair market value, or to continue to lease the farm, 
which would produce a higher monthly income. If the statute 
permits substituted judgments that are reasonable, the guardian 
can sell the farm to the son; if substituted judgment is permitted 
only when it is also in the farmer’s best interest, the guardian must 
instead continue to lease the property.43  
B. The Substituted Judgment-Best Interest Continuum Model 
Although substituted judgment and best interest are arguably 
opposite standards for surrogate decision making,44 we believe the 
better model places these standards on a continuum.45 In our 
                                                   
42. See Alan Meisel & Kathy L. Cerminara, The Right to Die, The Law of End-of-
Life Decisionmaking 4–11 (3d ed. supp. 2011). 
43. See, e.g., In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Jordan, 616 N.W.2d 553, 560 
(Iowa 2000) (holding that, although proceeds from the sale of the ward’s farm would pay 
the ward’s nursing home bill and relieve the ward of the costs of maintaining the property, 
such sale was not in the ward’s best interest because the costs of maintaining the property 
were minimal and the proceeds of the installment sale provided less income than did the 
rent that the ward had previously received). 
44. See, e.g., Casasanto et al., supra note 6 (discussing the rationale for each standard); 
see also Ursula K. Braun et al., Reconceptualizing the Experience of Surrogate Decision Making: Re-
ports vs Genuine Decisions, 7 Annals Fam. Med. 249, 249–50 (2009) (noting because of the 
“high evidentiary standards” which must be met for substituted judgment, surrogate deci-
sions made under this standard are really “reports” rather than “genuine decisions”); Pam R. 
Sailors, Autonomy, Benevolence, and Alzheimer’s Disease, 10 Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 
184 (2001) (arguing that substituted judgment should not be used unreflectively for inca-
pacitated persons because preferences stated when competent may not best serve the 
incapacitated successor self). 
45. See In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1280 (N.J. 1994) (stating that the substituted judg-
ment and best interest standards represent points on a continuum rather than dichotomous 
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research for the National Guardianship Summit, we synthesized 
the spectrum of viewpoints about substituted judgment and best 
interest into four decision-making standards: Strict Substituted 
Judgment, Expanded Substituted Judgment, Expanded Best 
Interest, and Strict Best Interest.46 We propose a model of decision-
making that treats these standards as points on a continuum which, 
when used to guide guardians, maximizes the self-determination 
interests of incapacitated adults. The following definitions explain 
the basis for decisions under each standard, and the diagram 
illustrates how the standards relate to one another on the 
continuum. A general description of the continuum decision-
making process is provided, supplemented by a discussion of 
factors that influence the application of each standard. 
1. Brief Definitions of Decision-Making Standards 
• Strict Substituted Judgment: 
Guardians should base their decisions on the incapacitated per-
son’s prior specific directions, expressed desires, and current 
competent opinions. 
• Expanded Substituted Judgment: 
Guardians may base their decisions on the incapacitated per-
son’s prior general statements, actions, values, and preferences. 
• Expanded Best Interest: 
Guardians may base their decisions on the benefits and burdens 
for the incapacitated person, as discerned from available infor-
mation, including the views of professionals and others with 
sufficient interest in the incapacitated person’s welfare. Decisions 
may also include consideration of consequences for others that a 





                                                   
tests). See also Daniel P. Sulmasy & Lois Snyder, Substituted Interests and Best Judgments, 304 J. 
Am. Med. Ass’n 1946, 1946 (2010) (urging that where a patient’s preferences are unknown, 
surrogates should use a “substituted interests” approach, based on a patient’s “authentic 
values and real interests,” to reach a “best judgment”). 
46. See Whitton & Frolik, supra note 15, for examples illustrating the application of 
these standards. 
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• Strict Best Interest: 
Guardians should base their decisions solely on the benefits for, 
and burdens on, the incapacitated person as discerned from avail-
able information, including the views of professionals. 
2. Illustration and Description of Substituted 
Judgment-Best Interest Continuum 
Standard Strict SJ Expanded SJ Expanded BI Strict BI
Basis For 
Decision
IP’s prior specifi c 
directions, expressed 
desires and current 
opinions




Benefi ts and burdens 
for IP based on 
available information, 
including views of 
professionals and 
others with suffi cient 
interest in IP’s 
welfare; may also 
include consideration 
of consequences for 
others that a 
reasonable person in 
IP’s circumstances 
would consider
Benefi ts and burdens solely 
for IP based on available 










No persons with 






IP=incapacitated person  
 
Decision making starts as far to the left on the continuum as 
possible. If the guardian knows the incapacitated person’s prior 
specific directions, expressed desires, or current competent opin-
ions, Strict Substituted Judgment should be used, provided that it 
does not produce an unreasonable result. If there are no known 
directions, desires, or opinions, or if following such information 
would produce an unreasonable decision, the guardian should at-
tempt to make the decision according to Expanded Substituted 
Judgment—relying upon the incapacitated person’s general state-
ments, actions, values, and preferences to discern what the 
incapacitated person likely would have wanted in the circumstanc-
es. Again, if this information is not available or would lead to an 
unreasonable result, the guardian moves to the next standard—
Expanded Best Interest—to assess the benefits and burdens of the 
possible alternatives, considering, when available, the views of pro-
fessionals and others who have demonstrated a sufficient interest 
in the incapacitated person’s welfare.  
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Under Expanded Best Interest, the guardian may also consider 
the consequences of the decision for persons other than the inca-
pacitated individual if such consequences are what a reasonable 
person in the incapacitated person’s circumstances would likely 
consider. If there are no persons available with a sufficient interest 
in the incapacitated person’s welfare, or if their views would lead to 
an unreasonable result, the guardian is left with only Strict Best 
Interest to guide the decision. The goal of decision making across 
the continuum is to give the greatest preference possible to the 
directions, views, and values of the incapacitated person and, 
where such information is not available, to consider the opinions 
of those who know the person best. We believe that this progres-
sion across the continuum results in decisions that most closely 
approximate what the incapacitated person would want. Guardians 
should resort to the impersonal Strict Best Interest standard only 
in the rare instances when they have no information about the in-
capacitated person’s preferences or values, and no contact with 
family or friends who could provide an authentic sense of who the 
person was before incapacity. The following discussion provides 
further explanation of decision making across the continuum.  
a. Strict Substituted Judgment 
To apply Strict Substituted Judgment, the guardian must have 
actual knowledge of what the incapacitated person would have 
done in the present circumstances. For example, suppose that the 
incapacitated person owns a sports car, but now suffers from severe 
dementia. When the dementia was mild, the incapacitated person 
had told her guardian that the car should be sold if she became 
too incapacitated to drive. Although the incapacitated person can 
no longer drive, her grandson suggests that the guardian keep the 
car and permit him to take his grandmother for rides in the car. 
Applying Strict Substituted Judgment, the guardian must deny the 
request and sell the car because that is what the incapacitated per-
son wanted.  
Unfortunately, Strict Substituted Judgment has limited applica-
tion because in most cases the incapacitated person will not have 
made an explicit pronouncement about the specific decision facing 
the guardian. If the guardian is limited to Strict Substituted Judg-
ment, often the guardian cannot implement what the guardian 
suspects to be the wishes of the incapacitated person. For example, 
suppose that five years ago, the incapacitated person made a gift to 
his church building fund of $5,000. Thereafter, the church suffered 
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a fire and now requests the guardian to make a further donation of 
$5,000 from the large estate of the incapacitated person. Under 
Strict Substituted Judgment, the guardian could not make the gift 
without evidence of the incapacitated person’s specific intent to 
make another donation, even though the guardian strongly sus-
pects that the incapacitated person would want to assist his church. 
Nevertheless, lacking certainty as to what the incapacitated person 
would have done, the guardian cannot apply Strict Substituted 
Judgment.  
b. Expanded Substituted Judgment 
The answer to the limits of Strict Substituted Judgment is an ex-
panded form of substituted judgment that relies on information 
about the incapacitated person’s prior general statements, actions, 
values, and preferences. Such information may be considered by a 
guardian in an attempt to understand what the incapacitated per-
son would have done if facing the same circumstances that 
confront the guardian. Under Expanded Substituted Judgment, 
the guardian does not have definitive information about the inca-
pacitated person’s desires with respect to the particular issue under 
consideration, yet the guardian can make a decision that repre-
sents a best estimate of what the incapacitated person would have 
done.47  
Expanded Substituted Judgment does not afford the degree of 
certainty that Strict Substituted Judgment does. The guardian can-
not be sure that a decision is the same as what the incapacitated 
person’s would have been, but by permitting the guardian to make 
reasonable inferences, the guardian can make a decision that re-
flects the values, preferences, and biases of the incapacitated 
person. For example, suppose the guardian is faced with whether 
to keep the incapacitated person in home care at great cost, or 
move the incapacitated person to an assisted living facility that will 
cost half as much. If, in years past, the incapacitated person had 
admitted her mother to an assisted living facility and had told her 
friends that it was a more practical response to the mother’s care 
needs, the guardian could conclude that the incapacitated person 
                                                   
47. See Kelly v. McNeel, 250 P.3d 1105, 1114 (Wyo. 2011). Ascertaining what the inca-
pacitated person would have done assumes that the individual’s preferences were freely 
acquired. Substituted judgment is not appropriate if the individual’s preferences were the 
result of undue influence. See id. Implementing such preferences would not be acting in that 
person’s best interest. See id.  
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would approve of a move to assisted living, even though the inca-
pacitated person never expressed a specific opinion about it. 
Decisions made under Expanded Substituted Judgment, like 
those under Strict Substituted Judgment, must be reasonable. If 
following the incapacitated person’s preferences would lead to an 
unreasonable action, the guardian must either reevaluate what the 
guardian believes to be the incapacitated person’s preferences, or 
reject application of Expanded Substituted Judgment and apply a 
best interest standard. 
At times, evidence of what the incapacitated person would have 
done is too thin to support even Expanded Substituted Judgment. 
The guardian should not apply Expanded Substituted Judgment if 
a reasonable person would conclude that there is insufficient in-
formation from which to determine what the incapacitated person 
would want. In such a case, the guardian will be forced to apply a 
best interest standard. But even when the lack of information 
about the incapacitated person’s preferences bars the use of Ex-
panded Substituted Judgment, the guardian may have some 
knowledge about the incapacitated person that can be incorpo-
rated into the decision-making process. A guardian should use this 
knowledge, based on direct experience with the incapacitated per-
son or on information received from others, to modify the best 
interest standard from a purely objective one to one that accounts 
for the unique qualities of the incapacitated individual.48  
c. Expanded Best Interest 
Like substituted judgment, best interest can take a strict or ex-
panded form. Under Strict Best Interest, the guardian should 
make decisions based solely on what best promotes the well-being 
of the incapacitated person. Strict Best Interest unfortunately ig-
nores the legitimate interests of third parties that the incapacitated 
person, if competent, would consider. Most incapacitated persons 
have others they care about, and if a guardian has instructions 
about what the incapacitated person wants for those individuals, 
the guardian can incorporate such instructions into substituted 
judgment. But when this is not possible, the incapacitated person’s 
concerns for third parties play no role in the application of Strict 
Best Interest. The solution is for a guardian to employ an expand-
ed version of best interest. 
                                                   
48. See Sulmasy & Snyder, supra note 45.  
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Expanded Best Interest permits the guardian to consider the 
consequences for others whose interests and well-being would be 
perceived of significance to the incapacitated person under a rea-
sonable person standard.49 Most incapacitated persons have family 
and friends, and belong to social and religious organizations. Ex-
panded Best Interest assumes that when making decisions an 
incapacitated person would take those persons and organizations 
into consideration. For example, an aging parent might deliberately 
live frugally in order to increase the value of the estate that will be 
passed on to his children at his death. Under Strict Best Interest, the 
interest of the children is irrelevant because the guardian must act 
solely on the basis of what is best for the incapacitated person. Un-
der Expanded Best Interest, the guardian could assume that the 
incapacitated person would have a concern for the well-being of his 
children and so would have preferred to assist a child financially 
even at the cost of modest reduction in his own standard of living. 
If, for example, the incapacitated person had an adult unemployed 
child who wanted to return to school to learn an employable skill, 
the guardian could legitimately use some of the incapacitated per-
son’s assets to pay the cost of the child’s tuition. 
Expanded Best Interest does raise questions about whose interests 
should be considered and the degree to which the guardian should 
assist those individuals. As with Expanded Substituted Judgment, if 
the guardian is uncertain as to the propriety of a proposed course of 
action, the guardian can petition the court for guidance. Courts in 
turn must take care that Expanded Best Interest does not cross over 
into exploitation or abuse of the incapacitated person—a risk that 
exists no matter which decision-making standard is used.  
d. Strict Best Interest 
When no knowledge about an incapacitated person is available to 
inform even an Expanded Best Interest analysis, the guardian is left 
with applying Strict Best Interest. The guardian is not concerned 
with what the incapacitated person would do, but does what a 
reasonable person would do in light of the particular circumstances 
                                                   
49. See, e.g., In re Whitbread (1816), 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch.). Although often cited as 
the case that first recognized “substituted judgment,” here the court made a decision for an 
incapacitated person in circumstances where there was no evidence of what the incapacitat-
ed person would have wanted. See id. at 878–79. The court approved an increase in the  
allowance for the incapacitated person’s niece, opining that someone in the position of the 
incapacitated person would likely prefer that outcome to the embarrassment caused by the 
niece’s poverty. See id. 
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and the relative benefits and burdens of the available options.50 The 
guiding principle for the guardian is to behave reasonably, with the 
understanding that different guardians might reach different 
conclusions about the preferred course of action. Moreover, the 
guardian may take into consideration the views and advice of 
others,51 provided the guardian is guided by doing what is best for 
the incapacitated person. On our Substituted Judgment-Best 
Interest Continuum, resort to Strict Best Interest will not be 
necessary unless the individual subject to guardianship is completely 
incapacitated and the guardian is a non-family member—
professional or volunteer—who has no knowledge about the unique 
attributes of the incapacitated person, and no sources from which 
such information can be gathered.52 
III. Proposal to Reform the UGPPA Substituted 
Judgment/Best Interest Standard  
Based on our Substituted Judgment-Best Interest Continuum for 
guardian decisions, we propose the following reform to Section 
314(a) of the 1997 UGPPA:53 
SECTION 314(a): 
Except as otherwise limited by the court, a guardian shall make 
decisions regarding the ward’s support, care, education, health, 
and welfare. A guardian shall promote the self-determination of the 
ward and exercise authority only as necessitated by the ward’s 
limitations and, to the extent possible, shall encourage the 
ward to participate in decisions, act on the ward’s own behalf, 
and develop or regain the capacity to manage the ward’s per-
sonal affairs. A guardian shall at all times exercise reasonable care, 
diligence, and prudence and, when making decisions: 
(1) act in accordance with the ward’s reasonable current or 
prior directions, expressed desires, and opinions to the  
                                                   
50. Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or Incapacitated Persons 
of All Ages, 35. J.L. Med. & Ethics 187, 188 (2007) (best interest “guides decision-makers to 
pick from among options that reasonable persons of good will would consider acceptable”). 
51. See, e.g., 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11a-17(e) (West Supp. 2011). 
52. See Naomi Karp & Erica Wood, Incapacitated and Alone: Healthcare Decision Making for 
Unbefriended Older People, 31 Hum. Rts. 20, 22 (2004) (urging that even for the unbefriend-
ed, long-term care facilities and staff should play a greater role in “investigating and 
conveying resident values and preferences” and should develop procedures for “collecting 
and using resident histories and values information”). 
53. Proposed language is shown in italics. 
Frolik & Whitton FTP 4_C.doc  8/3/2012 10:39 AM 
758 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 45:4 
extent actually known or ascertainable by the guardian; or, 
if unknown and unascertainable, 
(2) act in accordance with the ward’s reasonable prior general 
statements, actions, values, and preferences to the extent 
actually known or ascertainable by the guardian; or, if 
unknown and unascertainable, 
(3) act in accordance with the ward’s best interest as deter-
mined from reasonable information received from 
professionals and persons who demonstrate sufficient inter-
est in the ward’s welfare, which determination may include 
consideration of consequences for others that a reasonable 
person in the ward’s circumstances would consider. 
This revision addresses current deficiencies in adult guardian-
ship decision-making statutes by providing that:  
1) self-determination is the paramount surrogate deci-
sion-making objective;  
2) decisions based on substituted judgment should be 
reasonable; 
3) guardians should attempt to ascertain information 
upon which to base a substituted judgment; 
4) guardians should attempt to personalize even deci-
sions based on best interest by seeking information 
from professionals and persons who have an inter-
est in the welfare of the incapacitated person; and 
5) guardians may consider consequences to persons 
other than the incapacitated person when a reason-
able person in the incapacitated person’s 
circumstances would likely do so. 
This proposed revision to Section 314(a) of the UGPPA improves 
guidance to guardians and clarifies that the goal of self-
determination trumps best interest when surrogate decisions are 
made for incapacitated adults. The prioritization of substituted 
judgment over best interest is consistent with policies embodied in 
the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act54 and the Uniform Power 
of Attorney Act.55  
                                                   
54. See supra note 12.  
55. See supra note 13. 
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The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act contains three surrogate 
decision-making standards—one for health care agents,56 one for 
health care surrogates,57 and one for guardians.58 Each decision-
making standard within the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act 
mandates that the individual instructions of an incapacitated person 
must be followed. Guardians must “comply with the ward’s individu-
al instructions and may not revoke the ward’s advance directive 
unless the appointing court expressly so authorizes.”59 The provi-
sions for health care agents and surrogates mandate that decisions 
be made in accordance with “individual instructions, if any, and oth-
er wishes to the extent known,” and otherwise in accordance with a 
determination of best interest, which must include consideration of 
the incapacitated person’s values to the extent known.60 Thus, the 
decision-making standards within the Uniform Health-Care Deci-
sions Act are similar to the Substituted Judgment-Best Interest 
Continuum, requiring that consideration move from individual 
instructions to known wishes, and then to best interest informed by 
the incapacitated person’s values.61 
Likewise, the Uniform Power of Attorney Act requires that an 
agent “act in accordance with the principal’s reasonable expecta-
tions to the extent actually known by the agent and, otherwise, in 
the principal’s best interest.”62 In theory, a principal who pre-plans 
for incapacity by executing a power of attorney may be more likely 
to communicate expectations and instructions than an adult who 
later requires guardianship. In practice, it is doubtful many agents 
receive a statement of expectations to guide the decisions that they 
                                                   
56. See Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § 2(e) (1994), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1B, at 94 
(2005). 
57. See § 5(f), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1B, at 111 (2005). 
58. See § 6(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1B, at 116 (2005). 
59. Id. 
60. See supra notes 56 & 57. 
61. Given the unique nature of health care decisions, however, the Uniform Health-
Care Decisions Act does not require that substituted judgment be reasonable. In Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 n.7 (1990), the Supreme Court held 
that an individual has a constitutional right, grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
liberty interest, to refuse treatment. According to the Court, the “principle that a competent 
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treat-
ment may be inferred from our prior decisions.” Id. at 278. Since Cruzan, lower courts have 
increasingly taken the position that a competent individual has an almost absolute right to 
refuse treatment. See cases listed in Meisel & Ciminara, supra note 42, at 2–15 & n.63. 
When the patient has provided sufficient evidence of treatment preferences in case of inca-
pacity, courts almost always permit the surrogate decision maker to carry out those desires 
even if doing so will result in the patient’s death. See Lawrence A. Frolik & Melissa C. 
Brown, Advising the Elderly or Disabled Client 23–24 (2d ed. supp. 2011). The judi-
cial support for a surrogate’s right to refuse treatment for the patient can be traced to In re 
Quinlan, 335 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
62. Unif. Power of Attorney Act § 114(a) (2006), 8B U.L.A. 78 (Supp. 2011). 
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must make for an incapacitated principal. The Substituted Judg-
ment-Best Interest Continuum, while designed with guardianship 
in mind, can be applied as well to help agents reach a decision that 
approximates what the incapacitated principal would have wanted. 
From a policy perspective, it makes sense to harmonize the surro-
gate decision-making standards within the UPC, and from a  
practical perspective, surrogates need more guidance in carrying 
out their decision-making responsibilities.  
Conclusion 
The UPC, through the 1997 UGPPA, made a significant contri-
bution to the recognition of substituted judgment as the preferred 
decision-making standard for guardian decisions on behalf of in-
capacitated adults. The UGPPA substituted judgment/best interest 
standard, while innovative at the time, contains a number of defi-
ciencies, as do state guardianship statutes that contain substituted 
judgment provisions. Based on the evolution of surrogate decision-
making standards, we have proposed a new continuum model to 
clarify how surrogates can make decisions that maximize self-
determination interests. The goal of decision making across the 
continuum is to honor the reasonable directions, views, and values 
of the incapacitated person when such information is available 
and, when unavailable, to consider the opinions of the individuals 
who know the incapacitated person best. The model encourages 
surrogate decisions that respect, to the greatest degree possible, 
the individuality of each incapacitated adult. We believe that the 
UGPPA decision-making standard should be reformed not only to 
address deficiencies and harmonize surrogate decision-making 
standards within the UPC, but also to provide more effective guid-
ance to guardians and to states that are undertaking guardianship 
law reform efforts. 
